According to Tunisia’s recent presidential election campaign polls, no one has expected the win of Kais Saied, until the second round campaign on October 13, 2019 that have caused surprise. The analyses did not pay him attention, nor his speech, which was far from the vibes of the political language adopted since the fall of the regime of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali.
Ennahdha, the Tunisian Brotherhood movement, led by Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, has designated Abdelfattah Mourou as its candidate for the presidential election campaign, but he failed to get past the first stage of the elections. Thus, the movement called for a massive vote for candidate Kais Saied; after announcing the Kais overwhelming victory, Ennahdha expressed great joy. It appeared at first glance, a hidden alliance between the law professor and the sheikh of Ennahdha seemed to have taken place in a dark corner.
The proportions and numbers have dynamics to understand the shift in Tunisian’s mood in one week that separates legislative and presidential elections, which may explain the current crisis. Tunisians participated in the presidential elections with a turnout of 55 %, which a very high percentage compared to the turnout just a week ago in the legislative elections, which reached 41%. Kais Saied won with an overwhelming 72.71%, defeating businessman Nabil Karoui who received 27.29% of the vote.
Kais Saied’s victory transmits a strong public message against the entire political denomination that emerged after the fall of the previous regime. The failure of Ennahdha presidential candidate was even confirmed in the legislative election. Outside of this political space, only one man that have no party, has penetrated the presidential race to win this overwhelming percentage, and he expresses the popular desire to clarify the messages of the legislative elections, whether in the relative absence of participation or in the decline of “Ennahdha” (despite its being on the list of winners) by winning 19.55%, and obtaining 52 seats (out of 217) in the parliament, from 61 seats previously.
There is a remarkable difference between 72% for Kais Saied and 19% for Ennahdha movement. It doesn’t matter. Ennahdha has cheered Saied’s election to have a man in Carthage’s palace who will be a substitute for the failure of its original candidate. It succeeded in forming a Machiavellian alliance with the other parties, some of which described it as an extension of the former regime or accused it of corruption. The movement had repeatedly refused to work with “those who do not believe in the principles of the revolution and those who have suspicions of corruption”. In its maneuvering, it relied on the new president to form an executive bloc that it considered “consistent” with the results of the presidential and legislative elections.
However, Kais Saied, appeared to be disembarking from another planet, started promising a virtuous city. In his assessment, there were those who consider him as a conservative Islamist that Ennahdha rushed towards him, and those who saw him leftist, or Bourguiba, or even a worrisome populist. But it is certain that despite his modest constitutional authority, he was able to reactivate the position of presidency in the collective conscience of Tunisians, as a security force, a wise reference, and perhaps a source of Bourguiba power. The late President Beji Caid el Sebsi occupied some of this role by deliberating and compromise, while Kais Saied is preoccupied these days with confrontation.
Saied practiced politics literally only when he became president. Even as he campaigned, he used the rhetoric of the missionaries, not that of the politicians. The voters used to know him adopting a simple, direct campaign. Before that, they have known him only legally to perform well and appear in the media since 2011, explaining the simplicity of complex constitutional issues during the writing of the country’s new constitution in 2014. Prior to that, the man was known only as a professor of constitutional law, and the title “professor” remained in public life with respect and recognition for his academic scientific standing.
The current Tunisian event raises questions about the nature of the decisions made by Kais Saied, based on his interpretation (in the absence of the Constitutional Court) of Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution. The president of Tunisia, who know the laws and preambles, undoubtedly adopts the “radical solution”, using a legal arsenal that avoids the charge of a “coup” that donor countries do not like, and that could ignite a debate that threatens the democratic process achieved by the “Jasmine Revolution”.
The stability is the key on which Saied will rely to pass the “Corrective Movement” to his country’s political process. While the constitution does not allow the president to dissolve parliament and call for legislative elections that address political blockage, the Tunisian president is armed with what is deficient in the text of the constitution to propose controversial outputs that will rid the country of a serious crisis that the coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated its impact on Tunisians.
It is clear that this stability, which Saied is seeking in support of his position and decisions, depends on the commitment of the military and security establishment to obey its leader, the president of the country, and is based on communication with Tunisia’s trade union institutions (the General Labor Union in particular), civil, economic, and political. It is emerging from an international position that is still “understood” and a non-hostile observer, begging to respect democratic principles and preserve its pulpits.
In the debate that has become a confrontation between “the Sheikh” and “the professor”, a conflict between two entities and two schools is unfolding in the meaning of the state and how it is run, and in Tunisia’s political identity. It also represents a new predicament for political Islam that Ennahdha has tried to deny through the Sheikh’s theory of separating a politician from a preacher. The event also represents Tunisia’s conflict nowadays at a time when the mood of Tunisians has changed as well as the general international mood as it was on the eve of the fall of Ben Ali more than ten years ago.
It could be a legitimate fear for Tunisia’s democratic. However the constitution, which sought to reduce the president’s authorities to deter a return of dictatorship and elevate the authorities of parliament, failed to establish the powers to run the country. It is hoped that the event will be an occasion to rectify the concerns and hasty texts that have been spoiled.
It is a scene that reflects the reality of the crisis that was broadcast live by satellite channels. The sheik’s stand contemplates soldiers carrying out the professor’s order to freeze the powers of parliament. An accompanying voice of the elder pleaded with a soldier: “We have sworn to defend the constitution”. The soldier gave a straightforward answer: “We have sworn to defend the homeland”.
